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Уредништво: Православно духовништво и "православни" гуруизам Уредништво: О помињању епископа на Литургији: теолошко-канонски осврт Уредништво: 35 година литургијских новотарија у СПЦ - узроци, експанзија и тренутно стање Потресна исповест и сведочанство српског ђакона о највећој новотарској подвали |
Content Raw content Metadata Share Show Headers Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: Despite the impression of improved atmospherics following the May 23 Vienna talks on religious issues, Prime Minister Kostunica continues to work with more conservative elders in the Church to derail efforts by moderate elements to define a balanced and independent SOC position on Kosovo status. The results of the SOC Assembly of Bishops (May 15-27) may also reinforce this effort by opening the way for hard-liners to take important senior posts in the SOC hierarchy. We will continue to work for ways to strengthen SOC moderates including ways such as the Ambassador,s upcoming Contact Group/Quint level with the SOC Kosovo team. End Summary. 2. (C) On May 26, soon to be Bishop Irinej (Dobrijevic) (strictly protect throughout) met with poloff in the wake of the May 23 Vienna talks on religious issues in Kosovo. Irinej (Dobrijevic) was elected Bishop during an assembly of SOC Bishops held in Belgrade from May 15-27 and appointed to preside over Australia and New Zealand, but he is not likely to depart for his new assignment until the fall. As reported in reftel, Irinej (Dobrijevic) is a moderate voice within the Church and has confided his deep concern that the PM is using his influence in the Church to ensure full SOC support for the government,s position in the Kosovo status talks. His appointment as Bishop to Australia and New Zealand has effectively promoted him away from the center of SOC power while keeping his useful ties to Orthodox diaspora groups (and their associated funding sources) in hand. He has assured us that he will seek to remain engaged on Kosovo and in Belgrade until the final settlement. SOC reaction to the Vienna talks -------------------------------- 3. (C) Irinej (Dobrijevic) downplayed reports of an improved atmosphere at the May 23 round of talks (senior GOS negotiator Leon Kojen called it "useful and productive") and offered signs of a continuing effort by the PM to keep the SOC delegates in step with his policy on Kosovo. The composition of the SOC delegation in Vienna, Irinej (Dobrijevic) said, showed how the SOC had been co-opted. He called Bishop Tedosije the lone voice of moderation and said he was mostly marginalized by his superiors, Bishop Irinej of Backa and Bishop Artemije (Embassy note: Irinej (Dobrijevic) has recounted to us in the past how Irinej of Backa has worked openly and sometimes impatiently with senior government officials to silence more moderate voices in the Church. Amfilohije has also reportedly worked behind the scenes in a similar manner. End Embassy note). Bishop Artemije was particularly unhelpful in the aftermath of the May 23 talks by blasting the UNOSEK process in an interview with Belgrade daily Glas Javnosti on May 25. He declared he was "fed up with Albanian promises" and said there was "no progress" at the talks because UNOSEK is "not paying much attention to the results." Meanwhile, the Synod hardens ---------------------------- 4. (C) The outcome of the recent SOC Assembly ofBishops also suggests a hardening of the Holy Syod. In particular, Irinej (Dobrijevic) noted the "astounding" appointment of Bishop Filaret to the Synod, a person who he described as from the extreme right wing of the SOC and one of the only SOC clergy to insist on giving a eulogy at the funeral of Slobodan Milosevic. Irinej (Dobrijevic) told other Emboffs that the election of other new members of the Synod -- particularly "Bishops from Bosnia" -- would likely result in a harder-line SOC leadership. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that the SOC leadership's top priority (including Patriarch Pavle, Metropolitan Amfilohije) is to keep PM Kostunica in power so as to avoid a Radical government -- he called an SRS government a "nightmare scenario" for the Church. 5. (C) According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), Irinej of Backa has attempted to make political inroads with President Tadic to bring the SOC leadership close with the DS leadership (as it is with the DSS). According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), Tadic BELGRADE 00000879 002 OF 002 reportedly shouted at Irinej of Backa that the DS was not interested in these kinds of ties. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that Irinej of Backa had never been so directly rebuffed by a GOS official In fact, Irinej (Dobrijevic) told us of one occasion where Irinej of Backa reprimanded the PM for some offense in front of his closest advisors, warning Chief of Staff Nikitovic to stay out of the discussion. Tadic,s reported refusal to develop a relationship with Irinej of Backa may also be related to the fact that Tadic is working behind the scenes with senior Church moderates in an effort to influence the Patriarch,s succession. 6. (C) According to Irinej (Dobrijevic), the Bishop from Backa is often deployed by the Church or by the government as an interlocutor because he is perceived to be a moderate; in reality, says Irinej (Dobrijevic), he often presents different sides to different audiences. Irinej (Dobrijevic) said that Irinej of Backa behaved accordingly in Vienna -- saying "all the right things" during the talks but reverting to a hard-line stance when back in the company of his Bishop colleagues. 7. (C) Comment: Father Irinej (Dobrijevic),s observations provide some important insights into the complex in-fighting among the SOC,s hierarchy, a struggle that has only intensified with Patriarch Pavle,s increasingly frail health and rumors about succession. Father Irinej (Dobrijevic),s effort to forge a realistic, practical, and apolitical SOC position on Kosovo (and other issues of interest to the international community) has had to navigate difficult currents. His work in that regard has strained his relationship with the PM and raised suspicions about his motives among more conservative SOC leaders. We cannot rule out that his frustrations also color his description of developments within the SOC. The PM sees only trouble if the SOC position on Kosovo differs from his own, and he will do his best to ensure people who agree with him stay in charge of the Church. End Comment. POLT
Content Raw content Metadata Share Show Headers 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) Summary: The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has played an important political role since the end of the Milosevic era, increasingly collaborating with conservative nationalists to promote a mutually beneficial agenda that encourages conservative values at home and school, discourages strong action on ICTY compliance, and supports a hardline position on Kosovo. The church is likely to remain hardline in the near future as the status of Kosovo is determined, but moderate voices in the church could come to the fore if reformists lead the next coalition government after parliamentary elections January 21. End Summary. ------------- Brief History ------------- 2. (SBU) The SOC grew out of the tradition of eastern Christianity, following Constantinople rather than Rome after the Great Schism. Under Ottoman rule, the church became closely associated with Serbian resistance, which linked it to Serbian national identity and the resulting Serbian monarchy. In Tito's Yugoslavia, the atheistic state officially discouraged all forms of reigion, severely limiting the SOC's role in sociey. With the collapse of communism and the resurence ofnationalist movements in the 1980s and 90, the church saw a mild religious revival and an increase in its power. 3. (SBU) Th SOC played a controversial role in the Yugoslav wars, sometimes giving mixed messages. On the one hand, the church called for peace and reconciliation, but also issued a number of official statements voicing its support for Serbia keeping the conquered territories, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some individual bishops even went as far as to conduct services blessing soldiers just before important battles (as infamously portrayed in the "Scorpions" video from Srebrenica). In the aftermath of the October 5th movement which ousted President Milosevic, the church has moved to establish greater ties to the Serbian government, finding a willing ally in Prime Minister Kostunica, and has begun a campaign of desecularization. -------------------------- Factions within the Church -------------------------- 4. (SBU) Church member and critic Mirko Djordjevic described to Emboffs the divisions within the SOC as generally continuing along the same lines of pro-war versus anti-war that arose in the 1990's, with current Patriarch Pavle maintaining a balance between the two. However, he added, there are no clearly defined groups of hardliners and moderates, but rather a spectrum of views that vary based on the issue. Observers have noted that the more hardline bishops seem to be gaining in power at the expense of the moderates, as evident in the promotion away from the center of power of prominent moderate Irinej Dobrijevic (recently named Bishop of Australia and New Zealand), and the ascent of outspokenly conservative Bosnian clergymen at the last Bishops Conference. Some observers have also claimed that the influx of refugees into Serbia has helped contribute to the rise of the hardline faction, as these groups tend to be more conservative. --------------------------------------- SOC Relations with Political Leadership --------------------------------------- 5. (SBU) While various parties maintain contacts with the factions within the SOC, the party with the strongest church ties is the DSS. Aside from PM Kostunica's personal family ties to church leaders (his wife is neice to Metropolitan Amfilohije), observers remark that he and his party are actively working to ensure BELGRADE 00002065 002 OF 004 SOC support on a number of issues, most prominently the final status of Kosovo. A church insider commented that the DSS generally pushes for the advancement of the hardliners within the church, and is opposed to moderates gaining power. The SOC has also had traditionally strong ties to DSS members who have been Education Ministers, especially the previous minister, Ljiljana Colic, who frequently referenced the church in her decisions and called Saint Sava "the ideal of the Serbian education system." Dr. Milan Vukomanovic, a religion and sociology professor at Belgrade University, said the SOC is so linked to the DSS that its fortunes will ascend or descend based on DSS performance at the polls. The SOC played a central role in helping Kostunica get his constitution passed, with Patriarch Pavle garnering extensive media coverage as he was carried from his sickbed to cast a "yes" vote in the constitutional referendum. 6. (SBU) Other parties, while not as influential as the DSS, also have church ties. Observers say the DS has recently moved to improve relations with moderate church leaders, with some claiming Tadic is hoping to keep a hardline conservative from becoming the next Patriarch. Djordjevic and other observers claim that some church officials also have strong ties to the Radicals. Additionally, some analysts hypothesize that if the monarchist SPO develops closer ties to the royal family (to include perhaps putting family members on the party list), they could gain more support from the SOC, since the church is one of the most outspoken proponents of restoring the monarchy. However, with SPO polling under 5 percent in recent election surveys, and with Crown Prince Aleksander more of a mind to start his own monarchy party (on those occasions when he considers a political life), this scenario is unlikely. ---------------- Desecularization ---------------- 7. (SBU) Critics of the SOC claim that the church is pushing more and more for official integration into the Serbian state. In the current constitution, the SOC is not recognized as the official state religion, but it is granted "special status" as first among a list of 7 "traditional faiths" in Serbia. The SOC has publicly requested that it be given official status as the state religion, but so far this has been rejected by the government. Observers note that it already has de facto official status, particularly when considering the very close ties to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights says "behaves almost like an external government 'service' of the SOC." 8. (SBU) The Kostunica government has shown itself to be willing to compromise with the church on this issue, as evident in the Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations of July 2004, which granted the clergy of the SOC public immunity and solidified its primus inter pares status relative to other religions. The Religion Law was originally vetoed by President Tadic as clearly inadequate to European standards for protecting human and religious rights, but was passed over his objections by the parliament as a sidebar issue in an emergency session early this year. 9. (SBU) Although the new constitution explicitly states that Serbia is a secular state, the attitudes espoused by the current government tend towards ever more cooperation and accommodation with the SOC. Indeed, many political analysts and constitutional scholars see a heavy SOC hand in the drafting of the constitution, especially in the areas of social/family, religion, and education law. In addition, since the ouster of Milosevic, the SOC has been permitted (as have other religions) to BELGRADE 00002065 003 OF 004 provide religious instruction in public schools, revealing the lack of commitment to secular education. Djordjevic notes that while this religious instruction has shown little results in promoting religion among young people, it has been an effective tool for spreading the church's political message, which is most frequently represented by priests who teach students that the recent Yugoslav wars were justified and that Serbia should defend its territorial claims. ----------------- SOC Kosovo Policy ----------------- 10. (C) The church's official stance is that Kosovo must remain an integral part of Serbia, with independence or autonomy out of the question. On this issue, the church has made some of its most outspoken statements. Leaders of the SOC even went as far as to call for Serbs in Kosovo to boycott elections and not participate in the Pristina government. However, there are factions in the church pushing for a more practical response to the situation. The leading figure of the moderates on this issue has been Bishop Teodosije, who pointed out that the SOC has survived in many states under many circumstances, from the Ottomans to the communists, and that it would continue to survive in Kosovo no matter what the outcome. In fact, observers say that the most likely response to an independent Kosovo would be for the SOC to gain the same kind of status it has currently in Croatia. Many now believe the SOC would accept an outcome that Kostunica and the Radicals would oppose, so long as it adequately protected SOC rights and properties in Kosovo. So far, however, the government?s cooperation with SOC hardliners has kept the church from engaging constructively with Ahtisaari on the issue, so neither the clergy not the congregation has a clear idea of what protections are being considered. --------------- SOC ICTY Policy --------------- 11. (C) Internally, we are told, there are bishops on both sides of the debate over whether to turn accused war criminal Ratko Mladic over to the Hague Tribunal. Damjan Krnjevic-Miskovic, an advisor in President Tadic's office for religious affairs told us that privately, most of the leading figures in the SOC are in favor of Mladic's extradition to The Hague- either on religious/moral grounds or for realpolitik reasons of moving Serbia forward. Nevertheless, the SOC publicly continues to hold the line that the Tribunal is biased against Serbs, and that "only the Serbian crimes are singled out." There has never been an official apology issued for the church's role in some of the crimes of the recent Balkan wars, despite its documented involvement. -------------------------------- SOC on Euro-Atlantic Integration -------------------------------- 12. (SBU) According to church-watchers, the SOC is fundamentally opposed to what it sees as an overly-secular Western culture, and has frequently commented that integration would threaten the very identity of Serbia. Djordjevic points out that the SOC is wary of Serbian accession to the EU due to the fact that orthodox communities make up only a tiny minority of those religious organizations represented in the EU, and the church sees the Vatican as having much more influence. The SOC considers NATO membership to be an equal threat, and takes a pointedly anti-American stance on this issue, even going as far as to initiate the canonization process for a 3-year-old victim of the 1999 NATO bombings as a public reminder. --------------------------------------------- Relationship with Other Religious Communities --------------------------------------------- BELGRADE 00002065 004 OF 004 13. (SBU) According to Dr. Vukomanovic, the SOC at present is an inward-looking group of old men who, with the help of the current government, cling to the past and reject ideas of ecumenicalism being suggested by younger and more western-exposed clergy. Instead of working with the civil societies to increase understanding between the various ethnicities and confessional communities and build a positive new society, the SOC takes a retrograde stance, focused on building its political power base and righting historical wrongs. It has rejected the visit of the Pope to Serbia based upon old grudges from the two World Wars (in particular the Roman Catholic Church?s support of the Nazi encroachment) and the late John Paul II's desire to enfold the Orthodox Churches into the embrace of ecumenicalism. The new Pope?s expressed desire to visit Serbia is meeting continued resistance. In addition, the SOC has rejected the establishment and acceptance of other orthodox churches (i.e. the Macedonian and Montenegrin) in Serbia. ------------------------ Prospects for the Future ------------------------ 14. (C) The priesthood is aging. There were only 40 applicants for 300 fully-funded slots offered by the Faculty of Religion for students interested in studying for the priesthood. Church critics and some moderates believe that new ideas are stifled and those who have exposure to the West (particularly clergy drawn from the Diaspora) are shunted to areas where their voices will not be heard. Insiders and critics alike seem to agree that the church is definitely headed in a more conservative direction, especially when talking about the rising leaders. Both Vukomanovic and Djordjevic believe that the next Patriarch will most likely come from the group of more hardline Bosnian bishops, suggesting either Vladika Vasilije Kacavenda or Metropolitan Nikolaj as the two most probable successors. 15. (C) As long as conservative nationalists dominate the government, the GoS and SOC hardliners are likely to use each other to mutual advantage. The state helps secure a privileged place for the SOC in Serbian law and to encourage more conservative, revanchist ideology in schools and homes, which in turn builds support for a hard line from the SOC on Kosovo and ICTY, which in turn lends moral authority to the current government's policies. Should reformist democrats like the DS lead the next coalition government, though, there may be more support for moderate viewpoints in the church. Polt
Content Raw content Metadata Share Show Headers B. 05 PRISTINA 58 - C C. PRISTINA 24 D. BELGRADE 879 E. PRISTINA 494 Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Ever since moderate Bishop Teodosije welcomed Kosovo President Sejdiu to Decani Monastery on Orthodox Easter, the rift between Teodosije and hard-line Bishop Artemije has widened. After the visit, Artemije blasted Teodosije in the media, and the hardline Serbian National Council backed Artemije up. A letter from a Gracanica priest to the Synod in Belgrade criticizing Artemije appeared on the internet, and assailants shot at the priest's vehicle while he and his family drove through the Serb-majority municipality of Zvecan. Evidently in reaction to the rift, Bishop Teodosije attempted to resign from his position as the church's spokesperson in Kosovo, and a key moderate monk, Father Nektarije, left the clergy altogether. The situation has made Orthodox Kosovo Serbs increasingly tense, especially after a Kosovo police service officer and cadet were suspended in connection with the attack on the priest's vehicle. (NOTE. This is one of the cases hard-liners in the north have cited as an Albanian-inspired attack on Kosovo Serbs (Ref A). END NOTE). END SUMMARY. 2. (SBU) Despite their traditional religious relationship as spiritual father and son, a rift developed in 2005 between moderate Bishop Teodosije Sibalic of Lipljan, of Decani Monastery, and hard-line Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic, head of the Raska and Prizren Diocese. At the time, Artemije refused to participate in the Reconstruction Implementation Commission (RIC) developed to oversee the reconstruction of Orthodox Churches destroyed in the March 2004 riots (Ref B). Belgrade Church officials stepped in and selected Teodosije to participate on the RIC, and to represent the church in Kosovo to the international community and to the SOC Synod. The RIC successfully completed preliminary interventions in late December 2005, and tenders for the next phase of reconstruction will be launched in June and July, with work scheduled to begin this summer (Ref C). 3. (SBU) Relations between Artemije and Teodosije soured further when Teodosije welcomed Kosovo Albanian President Fatmir Sejdiu to Decani Monastery for Orthodox Easter on April 23, 2006 (Ref C). Several days earlier, Bishop Artemije had publicly refused Prime Minister Agim Ceku's request to visit Gracanica monastery on Orthodox Easter, saying such a visit would not be welcomed while displaced Kosovo Serbs (including Artemije himself) still cannot return to their homes. 4. (SBU) On April 26, Artemije blasted the decision by Decani monks to welcome Sejdiu on Easter in an article published on the diocese web site (www.eparhija-prizren.com), saying the visit took place without Artemije's blessing and created a false impression that things were improving in Kosovo. Teodosije responded in an article posted on the Decani website (www.kosovo.net), saying he had discussed the visit in advance with Artemije and Artemije agreed that a short visit and traditional Easter drink with international visitors would be acceptable. (NOTE. Marija Gavric, close family friend and former protocol assistant to Bishop Artemije told PolOff on June 9 that Artemije suffers from extremely poor health and is getting senile, often forgetting things from one day to the next. END NOTE.). 5. (SBU) In the statement, Teodosije said he also discussed the visit with a high official from the state institutions in Belgrade, who told Teodosije that it would not be a problem if Sejdiu visited as a guest, as long as there was no political discussion. Belgrade officials criticized Teodosije several months ago when Kosovo Albanian politician Veton Surroi visited Decani monastery as part of his outreach PRISTINA 00000495 002 OF 003 to Kosovo's minority communities. 6. (SBU) On April 27 the hard-line Serbian National Council (SNC) issued a press statement (published on Artemije's web site) sharply criticizing Teodosije and moderate Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic for welcoming Sejdiu to Decani on Easter, and fully endorsing Artemije's decision to refuse Ceku. The SNC stated that Teodosije was "not authorized to speak on behalf of the Christian Serbs of Kosovo, the vast majority of whom disagree" with him, and asked Teodosije and Ivanovic to "desist at once from their words and actions that give comfort and encouragement to those who seek our destruction." They also asked Teodosije and other SOC representatives not to participate in the interfaith conference that took place at the Pec Patriarchate on May 2-3, saying it was, "hollow to speak of 'dialogue' with Islamic representatives while jihad terrorists plot the destruction of Christian churches they have not already burned, blown up or desecrated." 7. (SBU) Showing just how out of touch the SNC is with the SOC, high level SOC representatives, including Teodosije, Metropolitan Amfilohije, hard-liner Bishop Irinej (Bulovic) of Backa, and then Heiromonk (now Bishop) Irinej (Dobrijevic), not only attended the conference, but hosted it (Ref D). Representatives of the Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and Jewish communities also participated. Artemije was notably absent. In a common statement issued afterwards, the participants acknowledged that, "all communities have suffered," they further condemned "the destruction of all churches, mosques, cemeteries and other religious sites," and commended the restoration process. 8. (SBU) Afterwards a letter sharply criticizing Artemije for his statements against Teodosije appeared on a Serbian Orthodox Church internet forum, purportedly signed by Father Srdjan (Stankovic), secretary of the Raska and Prizren diocese (based at Gracanica monastery), along with diocesan officials from Prizren, Pristina, Mitrovica and Gnjilane. The letter says that believers and clergy are greatly confused by the clashes in the media between Artemije and Teodosije, and urged church leaders to be more engaged in seeking solutions. The letter praised Teodosije for everything the Decani brotherhood did for Serb and Albanian people before, during and after the conflict. The letter also criticized the fact that the "one-sided" SNC statement was sent to every priest personally. 9. (C) On May 6 assailants shot at Father Srdjan's vehicle while he was driving with his family through the village of Rudare, in Zvecan municipality in northern Kosovo. Senior UN Civil Police (CivPol) official Grey Ferguson confirmed to E/P Chief on June 9 that a Kosovo Police Service (KPS) special unit officer and KPS cadet were suspended on June 7 in connection with the incident. Father Sava of Decani Monastery told PolOff on June 8 that Srdjan told him that he has taken his family and left Kosovo, on advice from CivPol. (NOTE. Father Sava said he believed the attack was carried out by the same groups responsible for other recent attacks in the north, who he says are looking to force the territorial division of Kosovo (Ref E). Sava said he opposes such a division, saying it would force Serbs in the south to leave. END NOTE). 10. (SBU) Teodosije and Artemije both participated at the May 23 status negotiations meeting on cultural heritage in Vienna on May 23. Gavric told PolFSN that during the May 15-27 Holy Assembly in Belgrade, Bishop Teodosije attempted to resign from his position on the RIC and as the authorized spokesperson for the church on matters related to Kosovo because of the ongoing rift with Artemije. She said the assembly refused his resignation, asserting that SOC interests are beyond any individual. 11. (C) On June 2 USOP received an email from Father Nektarije (Isak Vorgucic), a Decani monk, saying that he was PRISTINA 00000495 003 OF 003 leaving the clergy. Vorgucic said he was leaving for entirely personal reasons (having met a woman), but would continue his work as executive director and editor-in-chief of Radio KIM. Gavric later told PolFSN, however, that Vorgucic, who is currently in Nis, actually left the clergy due to the internal dispute between Artemije and Teodosije. (NOTE. Vorgucic had been living in the Gracanica monastery compound, where Artemije also resides, because of its proximity to Radio KIM in the Serb enclave of Caglavica. END NOTE.). 12. (SBU) Artemije has other problems brewing as well. Gavric said the SOC is currently investigating possible misuse of diocese funds by Artemije's personal assistant and close advisor, Father Simeon. Artemije appointed Simeon Abbot of Banjska Monastery in Zvecan in 2005, and Simeon is closely associated with northern SNV hard-liners, including E.O.-listed Marko Jaksic. According to Gavric, Simeon was personally behind Artemije's refusal to participate on the RIC, because Simeon wanted all reconstruction funds to be channeled through the diocese budget, without any external oversight. 13. (SBU) COMMENT. The public rift in the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo is adding to the overall distress felt by Kosovo Serbs. While they are used to conflicts among political leaders, they expect more from their religious leaders. Artemije has firmly aligned himself with the hard-line SNC, and together they oppose any attempts at reconciliation with Kosovo Albanians. Despite his radical views, Artemije does have significant support among the population, many of whom have more direct contact with him in Gracanica than is possible with Teodosije in Decani. USOP has not generally sought out Artemije since his radicalization. In a June 2 meeting in Gracanica, E/P Chief and PolOff found him friendly and open, although very clearly submerged in his own political reality with a decidedly anti-Albanian vision of both recent and remote Kosovo history. END COMMENT. 14. (U) Post clears this message in its entirety for release to Special Envoy Ahtisaari. GOLDBERG MODERATE KOSOVO CHURCH LEADERS, UNOSEK AND PRISTINA AGREE IN SUBSTANCE ON CHURCH PROTECTIONS
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